Archive for the ‘Implicit cognition’ Category

The beauty of simple models: Themes in recognition heuristic research

August 1, 2011 Leave a comment
The beauty of simple models: Themes in recognition heuristic research
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 6, No. 5, July 2011, pp. 392–395

Daniel G. Goldsterin, Gerd Gigerenzer

The advantage of models that do not use flexible parameters is that one can precisely show to what degree they predict behavior, and in what situations. In three issues of this journal, the recognition heuristic has been examined carefully from many points of view. We comment here on four themes, the use of optimization models to understand the rationality of heuristics, the generalization of the recognition input beyond a binary judgment, new conditions for less-is-more effects, and the importance of specifying boundary conditions for cognitive heuristics.

Keywords: recognition heuristic, less-is-more, memory, model comparison.

Categories: Implicit cognition

Feeling the Future: Experimental Evidence for Anomalous Retroactive Influences on Cognition and Affect

July 27, 2011 Leave a comment

Feeling the Future: Experimental Evidence for Anomalous Retroactive Influences on Cognitionand Affect

 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
 Volume 100, Issue 3, March 2011, Pages 407-425
Daryl J., Bem

The term psi denotes anomalous processes of information or energy transfer that are currently unexplained in terms of known physical or biological mechanisms. Two variants of psi are precognition (conscious cognitive awareness) and premonition (affective apprehension) of a future event that could not otherwise be anticipated through any known inferential process. Precognition and premonition are themselves special cases of a more general phenomenon: the anomalous retroactive influence of some future event on an individual’s current responses, whether those responses are conscious or nonconscious, cognitive or affective. This article reports 9 experiments, involving more than 1,000 participants, that test for retroactive influence by “time-reversing” well-established psychological effects so that the individual’s responses are obtained before the putatively causal stimulus events occur. Data are presented for 4 time-reversed effects: precognitive approach to erotic stimuli and precognitive avoidance of negative stimuli; retroactive priming; retroactive habituation; and retroactive facilitation of recall. The mean effect size (d) in psi performance across all 9 experiments was 0.22, and all but one of the experiments yielded statistically significant results. The individual-difference variable of stimulus seeking, a component of extraversion, was significantly correlated with psi performance in 5 of the experiments, with participants who scored above the midpoint on a scale of stimulus seeking achieving a mean effect size of 0.43. Skepticism about psi, issues of replication, and theories of psi are also discussed.


Author Keywords: psi; parapsychology; ESP; precognition; retrocausation

Categories: Implicit cognition

How do you fake a personality test? An investigation of cognitive models of impression-managed responding

How do you fake a personality test? An investigation of cognitive models of impression-managed responding

Publication year: 2011
Source: Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, In Press, Corrected Proof, Available online 28 June 2011
Mindy K., Shoss , Michael J, Strube

Because faking poses a threat to the validity of personality measures, research has focused on ways of detecting faking, including the use of response times. However, the applicability and validity of these approaches are dependent upon the actual cognitive process underlying faking. This study tested three competing cognitive models in order to identify the process underlying faking and to determine whether response time patterns are a viable method of detecting faking. Specifically, we used a within-subjects manipulation of instructions (respond honestly, make a good impression, make a specific impression) to examine whether the distribution of response times across response scale…
 Highlights: ► We tested three competing cognitive models of faking. ► The models make different predictions for response times across response scale options. ► We used a within-subjects manipulation to compare response time patterns for faking and honest responding. ► Individuals appear to reference a schema of an ideal respondent when faking. ► Response time patterns such as the well-known inverted-U cannot be used to identify faking.

Categories: Implicit cognition

Directed forgetting in explicit and implicit memory: The role of encoding and retrieval mechanisms

June 27, 2011 Leave a comment

Directed forgetting in explicit and implicit memory: The role of encoding and retrieval mechanisms

Despite the fact that directed-forgetting effects have been attributed to either retrieval inhibition or selective encoding, there has been no compelling evidence to suggest that either mechanism regulates performance in both implicit and explicit memory. Therefore, in two experiments we sought (a) to determine whether directed forgetting influences tests of implicit (lexical decision) and explicit (recognition) memory and (b) to examine the relative contributions of the encoding and retrieval mechanisms thought to mediate directed forgetting by having participants perform an external interference task (i.e., sequential finger tapping) at either encoding or retrieval. In Experiment 1, directed-forgetting effects were demonstrated by better performance on remember-cued than on forget-cued words for both lexical decision and recognition. In Experiment 2, external interference disrupted directed forgetting in lexical decision when it occurred at retrieval and in recognition at encoding. These results demonstrate that although directed forgetting occurs on both implicit and explicit tests, it may be independently regulated by differential retrieval on the former and selective encoding on the latter. The discussion focuses on the differential excitation of remember-and forget-cued word representations, as inhibitory processing seemed not to account for directed-forgetting effects in either implicit or explicit memory.

The psychological record

Categories: Implicit cognition

Implicit social cognition: from measures to mechanisms

June 22, 2011 Leave a comment

Implicit social cognition: from measures to mechanism


Most human cognition occurs outside conscious awareness or conscious control. Some of these implicit processes influence social perception, judgment and action. The past 15 years of research in implicit social cognition can be characterized as the Age of Measurement because of a proliferation of measurement methods and research evidence demonstrating their practical value for predicting human behavior. Implicit measures assess constructs that are distinct, but related, to self-report assessments, and predict variation in behavior that is not accounted for by those explicit measures. The present state of knowledge provides a foundation for the next age of implicit social cognition: clarification of the mechanisms underlying implicit measurement and how the measured constructs influence behavior.


Trends in Cognitive Sciences
Volume 15, Issue 4, April 2011, Pages 152-159

Categories: Implicit cognition